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Abstract: People make choices. Often, the outcome depends on choices other people
make. What mental steps do people go through when making such choices? Game
theory, the most influential model of choice in economics and the social sciences, offers
an answer, one based on games of strategy like chess and checkers: the chooser
considers the choices that others will make and makes a choice that will lead to a better
outcome for the chooser, given all those choices by other people. It is universally
established in the social sciences that classical game theory (even when heavily
modified) is bad at predicting behavior. But instead of abandoning classical game
theory, those in the social sciences have mounted a rescue operation under the name
of “behavioral game theory.” Its main tool is to propose systematic deviations from the
predictions of game theory, deviations that arise from character type, for example. Other
deviations purportedly come from cognitive overload or limitations. The fundamental
idea of behavioral game theory is that, if we know the deviations, then we can correct
our predictions accordingly, and so get it right. There are two problems with this rescue
operation, each of them fatal. (1) For a chooser, contemplating the range of possible
deviations, as there are many dozens, actually makes it exponentially harder to figure
out a path to an outcome. This makes the theoretical models useless for modeling
human thought or human behavior in general. (2) Modeling deviations is helpful only if
the deviations are consistent, so that scientists (and indeed decision-makers) can make

1

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2617791

predictions about future choices on the basis of past choices. But the deviations are not
consistent. In general, deviations from classical models are not consistent for any
individual from one task to the next or between individuals for the same task. In
addition, people’s beliefs are in general not consistent with their choices. Accordingly,
all hope is hollow that we can construct a general behavioral game theory. What can
replace it? We survey some of the emerging candidates.
Keywords: Biases, Game Theory, General Equilibrium Theory, Behavioral Game
Theory, Social Dilemmas, Experimental Economics, Heuristics, Bounded Rationality,
Learning in Games.
Disciplines: Economics, Political Science, Cognitive Science, Psychology,
Organizational Behavior, Computer Science.

Against Game Theory

Introduction
Scholars employ game theory to model interdependent decision-making in bargaining,
constitutional law, democratic stability, standard setting, gender roles, social
movements, communication, markets, voting, coalition formation, resource allocation,
war, and many other domains. For a review, with citations, see (Lucas, McCubbins, &
Turner 2013).

Game theory has been widely discredited: many studies have demonstrated game
theory’s mispredictions. People seem to be highly sensitive to frame or context and
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biased in their strategies. They follow heuristic decision-making. They are limited in their
ability to reason and learn. Many attempts have been made to create a behavioral game
theory by adding a correction for each of four-dozen odd mispredictions. (See Lucas,
McCubbins, & Turner 2013.) But the span of mispredictions is so great and so varied
that building in corrections for them produces a model that is computationally intractable
for actual human beings.

Review: The Elements of Game Theory

What is a game? A game, theoretically, is defined by identifying the players, the actions
available to them, the information they have about the game, when they have such
information, what they know about what others know or will know and when those
others will know it, the strategies available to them that define rules for what actions
they will take in making decisions, the payoffs that come with outcomes, the range of
outcomes, and “equilibria.” The acronym for these dimensions is PAISPOE: Players,
Actions, Information, Strategies, Payoffs, Outcomes, Equilibria. What is an equilibrium?
An equilibrium is a path of choices made by players in the game—a path that could
happen, given the dispositions of all the players as defined in game theory. An
equilibrium concept is a rule a player uses to pursue an equilibrium path. There are a
number of proposed equilibrium concepts that players might use. They have names like
“Dominant Strategy,” “Nash Equilibrium,” “Bayesian Strategy,” “Correlated Strategy,”
and “Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE).” The classic game theory equilibrium
concepts are “Dominant Strategy” and “Nash Equilibrium.” A pure-strategy Nash
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equilibrium concept, for example, is a combination of actions for all the players
according to which no player can benefit by unilaterally deviating from his or her
combination. For a review of types of equilibrium concepts, see (Maschler et al. 2013.)
To be generalizable, all of the attempts to model interdependent choice, classical or
behavioral, must assume that (1) people follow equilibrium strategies, (2) there are
specific types of people who choose a generalizable strategy over a class of tasks, or
(3) all people in performing a specific task choose a generalizable behavioral strategy.
Behavioral game theory is trying to build a layer cake on top of game theory, by adding
layers to the original model. Each additional layer consists of a correction to the
foundation. For example, Prospect Theory would eliminate certain strategies associated
with disfavored bets.

But the number of adjustments needed to build a behavioral game theory is so vast that
it cannot yield generalizable models. The literature has proposed many adjustments in
terms of bounds, biases, heuristics and context dependencies. This presents two
problems for behavioral game theory. First, experimental economists working in the
laboratory and knowing that subjects make one or more of these adjustments are no
longer in the position of knowing subjects’ true payoffs: we know only the experimental
economists’ view of the experimental earnings, typically thought to be the subjects’
earnings. What experimentalists do not consider is “context,” that is, factors like
unobserved experimenter demand and framing. Second, and most important, under
such adjustments, we do not know what the subjects believe. Most games, especially
those simple enough to be tested in the lab and simple enough that we can strip out
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most (if not all) of the effect of framing and context, assume that subjects share
common knowledge. Classical game theory requires players to have correct and
consistent beliefs. To have “correct beliefs” is to regard other players as following
classical game theory and to predict that they follow classical equilibrium strategies.
Indeed, it is also required that players know that other players know that they
themselves are following classical strategies and so on, ad infinitum. As Lupia et. al.
(2010) note, the condition is even stronger, in that a classical equilibrium concept
“requires shared conjectures. … Common Nash refinements ... continue to require that
actors share identical conjectures of other players’ strategies” (p. 106). This is part of
what economists assume when they accept that the players in a game share “common
knowledge.” As Smith (2000, p. 9) writes, citing two other winners of the Bank of
Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel:

“The common knowledge assumption underlies all of game theory and much of
economic theory. Whatever be the model under discussion . . . the model itself
must be assumed common knowledge; otherwise the model is insufficiently
specified and the analysis incoherent” (Aumann 1987, p. 473). Without such
common knowledge people would fail to reason their way to the solution arrived
at cognitively by the theorist. This is echoed by Arrow when he notes that a
“monopolist, even . . . where there is just one in the entire economy, has to
understand all these [general equilibrium] repercussions . . . has to have a full
general equilibrium model of the economy (Arrow 1987, p. 207).”1
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Nash showed that any two-player zero-sum game has an equilibrium and it was later
proved that finding this equilibrium is computationally tractable. (A zero-sum game has
fixed payoffs, where higher payoffs to one player result in corresponding lower
payments to other players.) This was the appeal of noncooperative game theory: we
could find equilibria that in turn predict outcomes of interest. But, even in the case
where there are only two players and two actions, we cannot expect humans to solve
non-zero-sum games, as they are computationally intractable or infeasible, falling into
the class of computational problems identified as PPAD-complete2 (for history, definition
and analysis see Daskalakis et al. 2009; see also Papadimitriou 2005; Chen & Deng
2006).

The core problem for building a behavioral game theory is that, as we add the biases,
heuristics, and context dependencies suggested by decades of research, we are
implicitly increasing the dimensionality of the computational problem of finding an
equilibrium. It may seem that building a range of possible deviations into the model
would help us build a better model. Doing so requires the bold assumption that a given
subject, when faced, e.g. with a series of non-zero sum games, deviates from classical
game theory in a way that is consistent from one game to the next, and even from one
choice to the next inside the same game. The result is indeed a generalizable theory -perhaps a false theory, but one that is at least generalizable. But for that theory to give
us purchase on modeling human thought or predicting human behavior, the deviations
in beliefs and therefore strategies, must—at a minimum—be consistent. They also must
be common knowledge: subjects will have no way to compute consistent strategies if
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the way in which subjects deviate from strategies is private information belonging to
only the capricious subject and unknowable to other subjects. That is the bedrock on
which the rescue operation for failed game theory must be built. Our evidence,
however, like all other evidence of which we are aware that touches on this point, shows
that this presumed bedrock does not in fact exist.

New Findings

Research Design

There are two important new features of our experimental design. First, we created a
battery of tasks. Our experiments use a battery of up to 17 games, several of which we
constructed by modifying the standard form of well-known games such as “Prisoner’s
Dilemma,” “Public Goods,” “Stag Hunt,” “Ultimatum,” “Trust,” “Chicken,” “Dictator,” etc.
The purpose of our modifications is to minimize or eliminate the framing of the game
and to present the games, to the extent possible, as starkly as they are defined in
prominent textbooks in game theory. For details, see (Lucas, McCubbins, & Turner
2013). We emphasize that, unlike the typical method of running experiments in
psychology and economics, where subjects face the same task repeatedly, our method
presents subjects with a battery of tasks. Additionally, unlike psychology experiments,
where subjects are typically paid in the form of satisfying a course requirement, and
unlike economics experiments, where subjects are typically paid at random for only one
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of the two to three dozen repetitions of the task, our subjects know that they are paid in
cash according to every action they take in every task.

Second, we added prediction markets, based on (Plott and Roust 2005; Wolfers and
Zitzewitz 2004). In these prediction markets, subjects could earn additional money by
placing bets on the choices that were made by the players with whom they were
matched and in many cases by placing bets on the collective choices of all subjects who
had played the game during previous runs of the experiment. We create a market,
specifically a betting market, where we invite subjects to bet on other players’ choices.
We quiz the subjects on the betting procedure so that we could both motivate them to
work hard to understand what the bets entailed and also to measure each subject's
compliance with respect to the betting tasks. The subjects were paid if their bets
regarding the other player's actions were accurate and they were given a chance to also
double down on their bets if they felt confident about their predictions. Subjects
understood that they can earn this extra money from betting, and how much for each
bet. For example, in the Trust Game, there are two players randomly paired—Player 1
and Player 2; both start with $5; Player 1 can select any number of dollars from 0 to 5 to
give away; those dollars are taken from Player 1, tripled by the experimenters, and
given to Player 2; after receiving them, Player 2 has the opportunity to transfer back any
number of the dollars that Player 2 has in total, including Player 2’s original $5. At this
point, Player 2 may have any number of dollars between 5 and 20. We ask Player 1 to
guess how many dollars Player 2 will return. Later, but before Player 2 learns Player
1’s choice, we ask Player 2 to guess how many dollars Player 1 selected to give away.

8

We also ask Player 2 to guess how much Player 1 predicted Player 2 would transfer
back to Player 1. After Player 2 learns Player 1’s choice, we then ask Player 2 to guess
how much Player 1 predicted that Player 2 would return. All players know that a player
earns $3 for each correct guess and nothing for a guess that is wrong. The questions
we ask vary slightly for each task, but, as an example, here is an exact question we ask
Player 1 in the Trust Game: “How much money do you guess the other person
transferred back to you? If you guess correctly, you will earn $3. If not, you will neither
earn nor lose money.” Players know that, with one exception, they can never learn
whether their predictions (bets) were right or wrong and that subjects never have any
information about other subjects’ guesses (bets). The exception is the rare case in
which Player 2 in a sequential game, such as Trust or Ultimatum, must know Player 1’s
choice in order for Player 2 to understand Player 2’s situation and payoffs. For example,
Player 2 in Trust must be informed of how many dollars Player 1 chose to give away, if
Player 2 is going to know how many dollars Player 2 has and therefore what the
possible actions and payoffs are. Even then, the delivery of this information to Player 2
and Player 2’s subsequent choice are postponed to the last set of choices a Player
makes, so as to have no effect on previous choices. Payments to subjects are made in
a lump sum, without accounting or explanation, individually, anonymously and privately,
when the experiment is completed.3 We do this to eliminate any opportunity for subjects
to make inferences about other players’ choices (either individually or collectively), and
subjects know this before they make any of their many choices in the extensive battery.
For details on these prediction markets in a range of games, see (Lucas, McCubbins, &
Turner 2013).
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Results

Across our battery of tasks, our results verify decades of research demonstrating that
subjects do not follow game-theoretic predictions. Consider a traditional Ultimatum
Game. According to Andreoni and Blanchard (2006, page 307), this game “has come to
symbolize the power” of classical game theory and “its utter failure in practice.” In this
“bargaining game,” a “proposer” makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to a “responder,” who
then accepts or rejects the offer. The classical equilibrium prediction is that, if players
care only about their own monetary payoffs, then the responder will accept any positive
offer the “proposer” makes. (More technically, not counting the “endowment” of dollars
with which players begin—in our experiment, for example, the proposer begins with $10
and the responder with $0—, if we assume that players care only about the money they
earn, then the Nash Equilibrium prediction for the responder is that the responder will
accept any positive offer the “proposer” makes; and the Nash Equilibrium prediction for
the proposer is that, knowing that the responder will accept any positive offer, the
proposer will reason by backward induction to choose the smallest possible positive
offer allowed by the game.) Despite the stark framing of our experimental tasks, our
results generally replicate what others have found about the poverty of classical Nash
Equilibrium predictions (see Camerer 2003). For example, only slightly more than 6% of
our subjects chose the classical strategy when they play the Ultimatum Game.
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But the question we focus on with our battery of experimental games is, when players
“deviate” from the classical strategies, do they do so consistently? The answer is no,
and if there is no consistency, then the modifications to classical game theory cannot
provide a generalizable model of behavior. For example, the first half of our Trust Game
is exactly like a game that we call “Donation”: a given subject as Player 1 in Trust is in
exactly the same payoff and action situation as he is when he is the Donor in Donation.
Accordingly, we can measure whether a given subject is consistent across these two
situations. In addition, the second half of our Trust Game is exactly like our Dictator
Game: a given subject as Player 2 in our Trust Game faces the same incentives and
action possibilities as he faces when he is the Dictator in our Dictator Game.4 We thus
can measure whether a given subject is consistent across these two situations. In
addition, all subjects completed a Trust Game where they made choices as Player 1
and also completed a Trust Game where they made choices as Player 2. We therefore
can examine the consistency of a given subject’s behavior within a game, namely Trust.
(See Lucas, McCubbins, and Turner 2013 for details.)

Our findings show that in Trust, there is large variance in behavior across subjects in
the role of Player 1 and also in the role of Player 2. (We discuss findings in more detail
in an appendix.)
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They also show that there is large variance in behavior by the same subject in those two
roles. We expected to find that subjects deviate from predicted behavior for each and
every task, but, for example, our results show much more than that for Trust, Dictator,
and Donation: fewer than 15% of our subjects deviate consistently from classical
equilibrium concepts across the four tasks involved in those games.5 For these four
tasks, by even the most minimal definition of consistency, only 42% of our subjects
either consistently follow classical equilibrium concepts or consistently deviate from
them. That is, a minority of subjects have even the most minimal consistency from task
to task. We report on similar results in (Lucas, McCubbins, & Turner 2013).

This suggests that simple amendments to game theory, such as adding social
preferences of one sort or another, risk preference, or discovering each subject’s
individual level of experience or ability to undertake the reasoning necessary to choose
an optimal strategy, or the level of randomness in each individual’s choices, cannot by
themselves explain the inconsistent pattern of choices across the battery of games in
our experiment. For example, sometimes the subject may “appear” altruistic, in one
choice, and then “appear” greedy in another choice, even though the incentives are
identical and are stated identically for the two tasks. Some subjects are altruistic some
of the time, other subjects are altruistic most of the time, and some subjects are never
altruistic. At best, we need amendments to game theory that differ for each and every
game and for each individual. This would make it difficult, or impossible, to provide a
general explanation of behavior that is built on game theory.
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Game theoretic predictions about behavior depend upon the assumption that beliefs
and choices are aligned. Researchers rarely possess knowledge of the actual beliefs of
subjects. But our within-subject experiments allow us to test beliefs, and we find that for
individual subjects there is routine and ubiquitous inconsistency across choice and
beliefs. (See appendix and McCubbins, Turner, & Weller 2012.) We demonstrate that
subjects’ beliefs are often inconsistent with equilibrium predictions, which has not been
widely appreciated. Our findings also show that these deviations are not consistent;
they depend on the specific setting and task. These deviations are so pervasive and so
various even within a single subject that is seems unwarranted to refer to them as
“deviations.” On the contrary, consistent “Nash behavior and beliefs” appear to be
remarkable deviations from human cognitive patterns and human behavior.

Advance Directive for Behavioral Game Theory: Do Not Resuscitate

Our results show, as has often been shown, that subjects deviate from the predictions
made by classical equilibrium analysis in game theory. We emphasize that (1) subjects
often deviate from these predictions, but that (2) for the vast majority of subjects, their
deviations are themselves not consistent even across similar tasks, and (3) there is
large variance in how different subjects choose for any individual task. Moreover, we
show (4) that individuals’ beliefs about other subject’s choices or beliefs do not support
classical Nash Equilibrium strategies, and (5) that there is large variance between
subjects and among a single subject’s beliefs from task to task. Additionally, we show
that individuals do not hold common beliefs about game strategy or deviations from
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equilibrium. Individuals’ beliefs seem to be specific to particular settings and not
generalizable from one setting to the next. Indeed, it may be misleading to refer to these
patterns of action and belief as “deviations” at all. There are no consistent deviations
from classical equilibrium concepts, and thus there is no general behavioral fix. There
are about four dozen deviations from classical game theoretic predictions identified in
the literature. We find that the same individual subject will be deviating from game
theoretic predictions in as many ways as there are tasks in our experiment and that
across all subjects in our experiment we see a great variability from one subject to the
next in the pattern of deviations. It is unsurprising, for example, that some subjects are
altruistic in some settings. It is unsurprising that we find that some fraction of the
subjects are altruistic for one or another task. It is more surprising that subjects are
altruistic in one task and then not altruistic when offered the identical incentives again
later on. All these different variations of course interact with each other, giving a
complex and unpredictable landscape of complex variation running over individuals and
groups. Thus, adding behavioral assumptions to the general model of cognition within
game theory cannot make these general models more suitable for predicting behavior.

We have shown further that the protected core of game theory—the unrecognized
cognitive model, or Theory of Mind (McCubbins et al., 2012), of non-cooperative game
theory—fails repeatedly in hypothesis testing. The assumptions about human cognition
that are part of game theory, including the predictions of classical game theory and its
refinements, are at odds with what we know about actual human cognition. This is no
surprise, because the equilibrium concepts were not constructed based on how actual
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humans think, reason, or make decisions. We do not yet see a way forward to creating
a behavioral game theory that offers meaningfully generalizable predictions.
Accordingly, our advance directive would say: Do Not Resuscitate.

The Next Step

What are the alternatives to game theory, both classical and behavioral? What
possibilities are there for forming testable hypotheses about interdependent decisionmaking? 6 Within cognitive science, there are a number of lines of research about how
actual human beings make actual decisions, several of them reviewed in (Turner 2001).
These lines of research in cognitive science have had virtually no consideration inside
economics. Here are a few of them:
1. Variation across domains and situations. Entire subfields of cognitive science
are dedicated to the ways in which human thought varies across different
domains and situations. Given basic considerations of evolutionary development
and fitness, there is no reason to assume a priori that the way a human being
thinks and acts with respect to food, mating, entertainment, and so on would
follow the same patterns or principles of reasoning and decision. All models of
game theory, classical and behavioral, assume the opposite, namely, that
although people might have different preferences with respect to these different
domains, their patterns of reasoning and choice must be uniform across them.
Game theory models two situations as identical if they have the same game
structure, regardless of the content. It does not matter, for example, that the
“Stag Hunt” game might concern growing vegetables or killing soldiers. To a
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cognitive scientist, or maybe just to anybody other than a game theorist, that
approach looks like a non-starter. It certainly should be discarded as an
assumption.
2. Learning. Entire subfields of cognitive science are dedicated to the various
mental operations involved in learning, and to the study of how human thought
and action depend upon the highly flexible and powerful learning for which
human beings are equipped. To give one example, cognitive science routinely
considers the power of analogy or blending: one remembers a previous specific
situation, perhaps in childhood, or from a biography, or even from a science
fiction novel, and remembers, too, its outcomes; one then uses those concepts
and knowledge to inform one’s understanding and decisions in the present
specific situation. These traditions in cognitive science have no status inside
game theory, even though they provide a basis for hypotheses and tests about
decision-making. Indeed, the validity of measuring such powers of analogy and
blending is so unquestioned in Western culture that assessments of this ability
are used as part of the process of deciding who has what IQ and which
applicants to college should be admitted.
3. Complexity and nonlinearity. The world is rich, and in the typical situation, actors
are engaged in simultaneous games that overlap. In life, any action is usually a
move in many different games. Strategies to maximize expected utility over all
these games are typically nonlinear. In principle, the output of any subgame of
any game can be input to any subgame of any other game. Game theory by
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contrast assumes a partitioning of thought and action to tiny scripts of activity that
are pretty much separate from all others. This assumption could be discarded.
4. Adaptive behavior. In the typical situation, people are adaptive: their first and
strongest disposition is often not to play the game but to reinvent it, change it.
Their decisions can be driven by attempts to change the game from the outside.
Game theory leaves no room for this normal and routine thought and behavior.
5. Construal. Cognitive science routinely investigates our rich capacities for
differing construals of the same given material. “The mountain range runs from
Canada to Mexico” and “The mountain range runs from Mexico to Canada” deal
with the same stuff but call for quite different emphases and viewpoints. They
also both call for conceptualization by using the idea of motion (“runs from . . .
to”) even though in some sense we think that no motion is involved. Construal is
a crucial part of interdependent decision-making, because actors try to
reconstrue history and to get other actors to do the same. In the typical situation,
actors work at conceptual reinterpretation of the history of play, so as to
persuade other actors that the value and status of a past action must be
changed, and further, to persuade them that the action led to nodes different
from those to which it was once thought to lead. Conceptually, the history of the
game is not fixed. Game theory assumes the opposite.
6. What’s up? Actors must operate in general without knowing what game they are
in, and the question always arises, who has the authority to recognize and
establish the game being played? Actors attempt to influence other actors'
thoughts about the game being played.
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7. Identity. Cognitive science routinely considers the work people do to construct
an identity for themselves, and to carry it and vary it appropriately from situation
to situation. It may often be that the principle payoff in any scripted activity is not
the local payoffs but the actor’s concept of a personal identity. When we enter
different situations, different rooms, different moments, what does the present
offer by way of allowing us to construct an identity? What looks like fatal
inconsistency from the point of view of game theory might look like fruitful
experimentation, learning, and fluidity from the point of view of actual human
beings.

Within the social sciences, it has been shown that institutions (laws, constitutions,
auction mechanisms, common agency, families, friendships, societal structures, and so
on) serve to create not only incentives for choice but also a set of shared mental models
about players, actions, payoffs, outcomes, and perhaps most important, information.
This would imply that the study of institutions might supply some of the cognitive
grounding that game theory is currently lacking. Yet another assumption of game
theory is that from knowledge about players, actions, payoffs, outcomes, and
information, one can derive strategies and equilibria. It is unknown whether this is true,
but what is clear is that institutions have already influenced how subjects derive
strategies and equilibria. People, developed within institutions, are thus, when they
enter our experiments, far from a tabula rasa. There is little reason to imagine that the
narratives that we can give them in an experiment are strong enough to offer much
hope of overcoming that training within institutions. There is little reason to think that
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these narratives in experiments would substitute for the purported “10,000 hours” of
learning and practice needed to be successful at a given task. Accordingly, the cognitive
study of decision-making must include the study of learning within institutions.

In short, we think that the future for game theory, if there is one, would come from a
grounding in cognitive science, or more generally, in the analysis of how the cognitively
modern human mind works, what its basic mental operations are, and how they are
deployed in situations. We know that strategic games like chess arose very late in
human evolution and even in human culture, and that people are very poor at such
games in general and must undergo extensive training in order to play them well. Such
games of strategy are perhaps the last place one should look for a model of human
decision-making generally. Game theory has placed itself into that cul-de-sac, but there
is no reason for that sterility and isolation. One could instead begin with how actual
human beings think.
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Appendix on experimental data

This appendix provides details of subjects’ behavior in Trust, Dictator, and Donation.
First, examining play within the Trust Game, we find that 56% of subjects as Player 1
sent money to Player 2. On average, they sent $1.43, with a standard deviation of
$1.70. On average, as Player 2, they return $1.23, with a standard deviation of $2.29.
Our emphasis is not on the well-established deviance from classical predictions in Trust
(indeed, the standard deviation from our experiments is somewhat smaller than that
usually reported), but rather on the large variance in behavior both across subjects in
both tasks and by the same subject across different tasks. Only 1 of the 80 subjects
who as Player 2 received $0 from Player 1 returned any money to Player 1. Of the 100
subjects who did receive money as Player 2, 62 of them returned something. The
average returned for this subset is $2.22, again with a large variance (the standard
deviation is $2.71). Second, for the 62 who as Player 2 returned money to Player 1 after
receiving money, only 40 sent money when they were the Dictator; and of those 40,
only 29 sent money when they were in the role of Donor. Was a subject’s pattern of
deviation from classical equilibrium consistent? There are 42 subjects who deviate from
classical equilibrium as both Player 1 and Player 2 in Trust. Of these 42, 33 also
deviated as Donor and, of these 33, 26 deviated as Dictator. We see that fewer than
15% of our subjects consistently deviate from classical equilibrium concepts across
these four tasks. In sum, by even the most minimal definition of consistency, only 42%
of our subjects either consistently follow classical equilibrium concepts (specifically,
“Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium,” SPNE) or consistently deviate from them, in these
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four tasks. That is, a minority of subjects have even the most minimal consistency from
task to task. We report on similar results in (Lucas, McCubbins, & Turner 2013).

We turn now to reporting on the often hidden and never-tested parts of “equilibrium
concepts” in game theory, that is, the assumptions regarding subjects’ beliefs and
knowledge. In the Trust Game, for example, the classical SPNE prediction for both
players is that they will send $0 for all tasks. Thus, if our subjects hold beliefs that
support SPNE, both Player 1 and Player 2 should expect the other person in each task
to send $0. Further, they should expect that the other player expects that they will send
$0. (And so on ad infinitum: they should expect that the other expects that they expect
that the other player will send $0; and so on.) When acting as Trust Player 1, however,
88 of 180 subjects bet, and thus can be thought to believe, that Player 2 will return
some money to them. Likewise, when in the role of Player 2 in Trust, the majority of
participants (112 of 180) believe that Player 1 will send them more than the equilibrium
amount of $0. Indeed, only 21% (38 of 180) hold the “correct” SPNE beliefs and, as
both Player 1 and Player 2, bet that the other person will send nothing. (More
elaborately, since the “other person” is always that other subject with whom the subject
has been randomly paired for that specific task, only 21% of players expect both when
they are Player 1 and later when they are Player 2 that the other subject with whom
they have been randomly paired for that particular game will send nothing.) 58 of 180
participants bet when they are in both roles—that is Player 1 and Player 2—that the
other person will send more than $0. In general, participants do not hold beliefs that
support a SPNE.
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Examining consistency of belief in more depth, we can ask, for example, how many of
the 180 subjects in our analysis consistently held beliefs that support a SPNE? As
Player 2, participants made guesses about Player 1's prediction of how much Player 2
would return, and only 92 of 180 made guesses that support a SPNE. Of those 92, only
41 also held SPNE-consistent beliefs as Player 2 when guessing how much Player 1
predicted that Player 2 guessed Player 1 would transfer. Of those 41, 33 were also
SPNE-consistent as Player 2 when guessing how much Player 1 would transfer. Of
those 33, 29 were also SPNE-consistent as Player 1 when guessing how much Player 2
predicted that Player 1 guessed that Player 2 would return. Of those 29, 27 were also
SPNE-consistent as Player 1 when guessing both (A) how much Player 2 would return
and (B) how much Player 2 predicted that Player 1 would send. In sum, only 15% of our
subjects consistently adhere to beliefs that support a SPNE as Player 1 and as Player 2
in a single game, Trust.
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NOTES

1

Smith here quotes a reprint of an original article by Arrow: Arrow, Kenneth J. 1986.

“Rationality of Self and Others in an Economic System.” The Journal of Business, Vol.
59, No. 4, Part 2: The Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory. pp. S385-S399.

2

PPAD stands for “Polynomial Parity Argument on Directed Graphs.” It is a complexity

class regarded as exceptionally difficult. In computational complexity theory, a problem
X is called “hard” for a complexity class C if any problem in C can be reduced to X,
which implies that no problem in C is harder than X, since a solution to X provides a
solution to any problem in C. If X is both hard for C and in C, then X is called “Ccomplete.” A problem that is C-complete is the hardest problem, computationally, in C,
or rather, there is no harder problem in C. A PPAD-complete problem is in principle “so
hard to calculate that all the computers in the world couldn’t find it in the lifetime of the
universe” (Hardesty 2009). Accordingly, it is difficult to imagine that human beings
playing a game would seek solutions by trying to perform such a computation. “By
showing that some common game-theoretical problems are so hard that they’d take the
lifetime of the universe to solve, Daskalakis is suggesting that they can’t accurately
represent what happens in the real world” (Hardesty 2009).

3

Except for on time show up fees that were paid to all subjects and except for

payments for the first quiz relating to general experimental instructions.

33

4

Of course, one difference remains, the Trust task is interactive while the Dictator task

is not.

5

That is, in making choices as Player 1 or Player 2 in Trust, in making choices in

Dictator or Ultimatum, subjects sometimes deviate and sometimes do not deviate from
classical Nash Equilibrium predictions. Those that deviate do not always do so, and few
subjects deviate on every choice and few never deviate.

6

Another way in which behavioral game theory has sought to account for ubiquitous

deviations from game-theoretic predictions is to add a random factor to human decisionmaking. One prominent such approach is “Quantal Response Equilibrium” (see
McKelvey & Palfrey, 1995). But it is largely impossible to put Quantal Response
Equilibrium to the test as almost any pattern of behavior is consistent with its predictions
(see McCubbins, Turner, and Weller 2013), especially when it is expanded to
“Heterogenous Quantal Response Equilibrium” (Rogers et al. 2009).
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